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Non-technical summary 
 
Open standard-setting organizations (SSOs) have emerged as important coordination and 
diffusion mechanism for information and communication technologies. Standards define a set 
of technical specifications which are intended to provide a common interface design among 
modules in a technological architecture. Open standards are developed in an open, voluntary 
and consensus-based process and licensed to anybody at reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms. Economic and managerial literature has begun to study cooperative standard-setting 
only recently. 
Little is known about the value of IP contributions to open standards for technology providers. 
On the one hand, the open availability of essential licenses facilitates entry and increases 
competitive pressure. Standard-setting codifies frontier technological knowledge and provides 
laggard firms access to technical experts. On the other hand, entry stimulation provides mix-
and-match opportunities to customers and installs the user base of the standardization 
approach which might be served with compatible products by technology providers.  
Open SSOs require their members to disclose upfront standard-essential IPR and associated 
licensing intentions. They are not required to search their patent portfolios for specific patents 
which might be essential. We employ a market value approach in order to investigate the 
valuation of financial markets for disclosing IPR to open SSOs. Our sample consists of large 
established companies which have been publicly-traded in the U.S. from 1986 to 2005. Pre-
sample information shall control for unobserved firm heterogeneity. Citations prior to SSO 
disclosure shall control for the importance of disclosed patents.  
We find that disclosure of standard-relevant IP ownership is positively correlated with 
company valuation if associated patent rights are referred to explicitly. This suggests that 
product market advantages from standardized technology outweigh the loss of exclusivity 
from contributed IPR. Prior literature suggests that firms with low R&D intensity benefit 
additionally from access to SSO expertise. This is not supported by our evidence. Disclosure 
of standard-relevant IP ownership without referring to a patent is negatively correlated with 
company valuation for firms with low R&D intensities. Hence, patents appear to signal the 
quality of technology contributions from firms with low R&D intensity. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Normen und Standards sind für die Verbreitung von Informations- und 
Kommunikationstechnologien entscheidend. Standards definieren einheitliche Schnittstellen, 
die die Kompatibilität verschiedener technischer Komponenten sicherstellen sollen. Standard-
setzende Organisationen entwickeln diese in einem offenen, freiwilligen und konsensbasierten 
Prozess. Die ökonomische Literatur hat erst kürzlich begonnen, kooperative 
Standardisierungsprozesse näher zu untersuchen.  
Offene Standards erleichtern den Marktzutritt und erhöhen den Wettbewerbsdruck. Sie 
kodifizieren die Grenze des technologischen Wissens und bieten technologieschwachen 
Unternehmen Zugang zu diesem. Offene Standards haben deshalb zumeist höhere 
Nutzerzahlen und ein breiteres Angebot kompatibler Produkte.  
Standard-setzende Organisationen verpflichten ihre Teilnehmer dazu, essenzielles 
intellektuelles Eigentum und die dazugehörigen Lizensierungsabsichten offenzulegen. Die 
Teilnehmer sind allerdings nicht verpflichtet einzelne essenzielle Patentrechte offenzulegen. 
Diese Studie untersucht den ökonomischen Wert der Offenlegung essenziellen intellektuellen 
Eigentums. Dafür verwenden wir Daten großer, börsennotierter US-Unternehmen zwischen 
1986 und 2005. Das durchschnittliche Markt-Buchwertverhältnis vor 1986 soll dabei für 
firmenspezifische Effekte kontrollieren. Die empfangenen Zitationen vor der Offenlegung 
sollen für die Wichtigkeit der offengelegten Patente kontrollieren.  
Die Offenlegung essentiellen intellektuellen Eigentums ist positiv korreliert mit dem 
Unternehmenswert falls einzelne Patentrechte offengelegt wurden. Die Vorteile eines 
größeren Absatzmarktes bei offenen Standards scheinen also den Verlust exklusiver 
Patentrechte aufzuwiegen. Frühere Studien deuten an, dass der Zugang zu technischer 
Expertise für Firmen mit geringer FuE-Intensität besonders wertvoll sein könnte. Dafür finden 
wir allerdings keine Evidenz. Die Offenlegung essenziellen intellektuellen Eigentums durch 
Firmen mit geringer FuE-Intensität ist negativ korreliert mit dem Unternehmenswert falls 
einzelne Patentrechte nicht offengelegt wurden. Offengelegte Patentrechte scheinen also die 
Qualität des technischen Beitrags durch FuE-schwache Firmen zu signalisieren. 
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Abstract 
 
Open standard-setting organizations (SSOs) have emerged as important coordination and 
diffusion mechanism for information and communication technologies. Open standards are 
developed non-discriminatorily and licensed to anybody at reasonable and non-discriminatory 
terms. Little is known about the value of IP contributions to open standards for technology 
providers. This paper provides a large-scale empirical assessment thereof. Our findings show 
that disclosure of standard-relevant IP ownership is valued positively by financial markets 
only if the disclosure refers explicitly to associated patents. The loss of exclusivity to IPR 
appears to be outweighed by the expected benefits from open standards. Patents appear to 
signal the technological quality of IP contributions from firms with low R&D intensities.    
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“At some level it is surprising that voluntary standard-setting works at all.” 
(Schmalensee, 2009) 
 
1. Introduction 
Standards define a set of technical specifications which are intended to provide a common 
interface design among modules in a technological architecture (Baldwin and Clark, 1997). 
Open standard setting has become an increasingly important coordination mechanism for 
technology providers and users (Besen and Farrell, 1994). This is due to at least two 
developments. At first, there is an increased demand for interoperability of products and 
technologies. Telecommunications, computers and electronics industries have made extensive 
use of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) and share increasingly 
similar technology bases (Rosenberg, 1976; Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995). Secondly, 
ownership of intellectual property has become more fragmented which raises the costs to 
secure intellectual property rights (IPR) for technology usage (Shapiro, 2001; Wen et al., 
2012).  
Standards may emerge as a result of market competition or from formal and informal 
coordination. This paper considers open standard setting organizations (SSOs). This particular 
type of standard setting has become increasingly important during the last decade (Simcoe, 
2007; Funk and Methe, 2001; Cargill, 2002). SSOs are non-profit organizations which 
develop standards in an open, voluntary and consensus-based process. Any interested party 
may participate and contribute to the standard development process. Licenses for essential 
IPR of SSO standards shall be provided at reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to 
anybody. These organizations provide a neutral forum for technology owners to agree on 
standardized interface designs based on technical merit. The IP bylaws of open SSOs ensures 
the neutrality of the forum and limit antitrust concerns (Lerner and Tirole, 2006; Chiao et al. 
2007, Gilbert, 2009). 
Standards have been shown to contribute to national growth and to facilitate international 
trade flows (Swann et al., 1996; Blind and Jungmittag, 2008). Stakeholders value the expected 
product variety and global outsourcing opportunities (Blind et al., 2010). Consumers benefit 
from ongoing competition among providers of standardized products (Koski and Kretschmer, 
2004). Technology users benefit from the open availability of standard-essential licenses 
(Gawer and Henderson, 2007; Fahri et al., 2005; Huang et al., 2013). Hence, standards 
facilitate entry of compatible products and increases competitive pressure (Wen et al, 2013). 
On the one hand, they codify technical knowledge which facilitates the diffusion and adoption 
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of innovation (Acemoglu et al., 2010; Bessen, 2012). On the other hand, if the technology 
offers various applications for differentiated purposes, entry stimulation provides users further 
mix-and-match opportunities and installs the user base of the standardization approach 
(Gambardella and Giarrantana, 2012). Incentives to participate and contribute to open 
standards are, thus, ambiguous for technology providers (Lerner and Tirole, 2004; Strojwas et 
al., 2007; Feldman et al., 2009; Layne Farrar and Lerner, 2011).  
The increasing evidence for user and consumer benefits from standards notwithstanding, 
evidence for the returns of technology providers to open standard setting activities is missing. 
On the one hand, technology sponsors can expect high returns from their participation in 
standard setting activities. Owning a patent-protected technology that is essential for a 
standard might for instance secure a stream of future licensing revenues. It may further 
increase the costs of rivals which are not participating in a standard (Salop and Scheffman, 
1983). On the other hand, participation in SSOs involves significant financial costs (Chiao et 
al., 2007; Rysman and Simcoe, 2008).2 Technology contributions to standard development 
processes may involve knowledge spillovers which threatens the competitive advantage from 
new technologies (Acemoglu et al., 2010; Bessen, 2012). This diminishes participation 
incentives of frontier technology firms since technology disclosures involve technical 
information beyond the details publicly available in patent documents (Blind and Thumm, 
2004). Furthermore, technology sponsors have to waive their exclusivity if their patent-
protected technology shall be included in open standards. They have to oblige themselves 
upfront to provide anybody licenses for standard-essential IPR on reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms. This limits their attainable licensing revenues and diminishes incentives 
to participate (Chiao et al., 2007). The advantages and disadvantages of standard setting 
activities render the question on its returns for technology sponsors to SSOs an empirical one. 
In this paper, we provide for the first time large-scale empirical evidence on the returns to 
sponsoring IP for open standards.3 We focus on standard-relevant IP disclosures rather than on 
technologies that are already part of a standard. The reason is that the firm faces uncertainty 
about whether their contribution will become part of a standard or not at the time of 
disclosure. Contributing firms likely unveil additional technical details during the standard 
development process. Hence, the disclosure of standard-relevant IP and associated open 
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 Chiao et al. (2007) report that IBM spent 8.5% of the R&D budget for standard development in 2005. 
 
3
 A study by Rysman and Simcoe (2008) that focuses on the patent level and on patent citations as a value 
correlate comes closest to ours. Rysman and Simcoe (2008) find that patents receive more citations once they 
have been disclosed as standard-relevant.     
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licensing intentions likely involves revealing technological knowledge along with uncertain 
prospects on the success of standardization. 
We employ a market value approach in order to investigate the valuation of financial markets 
for disclosing and contributing IP to open SSOs (Griliches, 1981). Pre-sample information 
shall control for unobserved heterogeneity (Blundell et al., 1995; Aghion et al., 2005). Since 
there is considerable heterogeneity between SSOs ranging from de jure public bodies to 
private alliances and consortia, we focus on a specific type of SSO (Leiponen, 2008; Chiao et 
al., 2007). First, we only consider open SSOs. Open SSOs are open in the sense that anybody 
may contribute to and make use of the associated standards, but they are also partially closed 
by requiring reasonable and non-discriminatory licenses (Dahlander and Gann, 2010).  
Second, we only focus on compatibility standards. Such standards define technical 
specifications of interfaces in a technical system. Our sample consists of large established 
companies which have been publicly-traded in the U.S. from 1986 to 2005. All the firms are 
active in industries in which at least one firm disclosed once standard-relevant IP. 
Our results from a market value approach show that disclosure of standard-relevant IP 
ownership is positively correlated with company valuation if associated patent rights are 
referred to explicitly. This suggests that product market advantages from standardized 
technology outweigh the loss of exclusivity from contributed IPR. The results show 
furthermore that technology providers with low R&D intensities appear to contribute 
important patents to standardization. Prior literature (Waguespack and Fleming, 2009) 
suggests that firms with a relatively weak technology portfolio benefit from access to SSO 
expertise. Our results show that IP disclosures of firms with low R&D intensities appear more 
valuable than those of R&D-intensive technology sponsors. However, this effect vanishes if 
the pre-disclosure importance of disclosed patents – as measured by citations that patents 
receive prior to SSO disclosure - is controlled for. Pre-disclosure citations account for the 
value of patents prior to SSO disclosure. Our finding does not support the conjecture that 
financial markets value the access to standard-setting technical experts by technologically 
lagging firms. It rather suggests that patents disclosed to SSOs by firms with a weak 
technology portfolio are of high technology value (Rysman and Simcoe, 2008). Disclosure of 
standard-relevant IP ownership without referring to a patent is negatively correlated with 
company valuation for firms with low R&D intensities. Hence, patents appear to signal the 
quality of technology contributions from firms with low R&D intensity. 
The next section develops our hypothesis regarding the value of waiving exclusivity in 
standard setting. The first subsection discusses the various processes by which standards 
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emerge. The second subsection discusses SSO’s capacity to act as forum for non-
discriminatory coordination, entry stimulation and diffusion of technical knowledge. Section 
3 lines out the estimation approach (Griliches, 1981). Section 4 describes our dataset and the 
standard setting organizations in our sample. Section 5 presents econometric evidence and 
section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1. Standard setting processes 
Standards provide technical specifications for a common design of products or processes 
(Lemley, 2002). Compatibility standards specify interface designs which govern the 
interaction of components in a technical system. The formulation of a common technical 
design codifies frontier technical knowledge which stimulates the diffusion and adoption of 
technical knowledge (Bessen, 2012). 
Standard setting processes are quite heterogeneous. The economic literature has focused 
predominantly on de facto standards. De facto standards result from competition among firms 
that offer competing incompatible technologies. Network externalities induce consumers to 
gravitate to one standardization approach (Farrell and Saloner, 1985). On the other extreme, 
de jure standards may be selected by public bodies which impose them by authority on 
industry participants (David and Greenstein, 1990). Besides administrative and pure market 
coordination, standards may result from a hybrid system of competition and voluntary 
coordination. Standards from cooperative coordination are likely to be of higher quality than 
those resulting from market selection; at the cost of a delayed introduction, though (Farrell 
and Saloner, 1988). Leiponen (2008) provides a typology of the various organizational forms 
of such forums. These may be private alliances, industry consortia or open standard setting 
organizations. We focus subsequently on the latter type of organization.4 
SSOs develop standards for designated technological fields in open, voluntary and consensus-
based processes.5 This ensures pro-competitiveness of open that standard setting processes 
(Lemley, 2007). Inter-firm coordination shall be prevented while competitors remain 
excluded. Users, consumer and government representation in standard development processes 
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consensus-based organizations. 
 
5A detailed description of the standard development procedure can be found in Appendix A. 
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shall prevent a too narrow focus on the interest of technology providers. In addition to open 
development processes, the use of standards shall be open. Standards shall be available to 
anybody without discrimination.  
However, participation and IP contribution of technology providers is voluntary. Consensus-
based decision making shall guarantee that standards are chosen on technical merit and that 
diverging interests are respected and incorporated. Open standards provide licenses to 
anybody but not necessarily royalty-free (Dahlander and Gann, 2010). In general, SSOs 
discourage intellectual property rights. Technology is standardized preferably if it is not patent 
protected or if non-discriminatory, royalty free licenses are available. If “technical reasons 
justify this approach” (ANSI 2011) 6 , patent protected technology may exceptionally be 
standardized if and only if licenses will be granted on reasonable and non-discriminatory 
(RAND) terms. Important royalty demanding technology may be standardized if no adequate 
royalty free alternative is available. Prerequisite is that patent owners oblige themselves ex 
ante (i. e. before standards are approved) to demand reasonable and non-discriminatory 
licensing terms (Swanson and Baumol, 2005). 
The IP bylaws of SSOs reflect the tension between formulating high-quality designs and 
guaranteeing a wide availability of standards (Farrell et al., 2007). As SSOs lack formal 
enforcement power, exclusive rights of technology providers have to be respected. IP bylaws 
provide a legal framework for the treatment of members’ IPR (Lemley, 2002; 2007). SSOs 
require their members to disclose any known IPR that might be “essential” to a standard 
before it is approved. Patents are deemed “essential” if it is not possible for goods or services 
to comply with the technical standard specification without infringing that patent (ETSI, 
2008).7 
Disclosure requirements shall prevent owners of essential patents to exploit opportunistically 
the market power, which is conferred by standardization.8 Once adopted, standards exhibit a 
considerable degree of lock-in. Industry-wide specific investments in standard-compliant 
machinery and equipment have been sunk, development of cumulative, next-generation 
standards may be underway etc. (Shapiro, 2001). Lurking owners of unanticipated essential 
                                                 
6
„Guidelines for Implementation of the ANSI Patent Policy“ (2011), available at: 
http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards%20Activities/American%20National%20Standards/Pro
cedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/Guidelines%20for%20Implementation%20of%20ANSI%20Patent%20P
olicy%202011.pdf 
 
7The ETSI Intellectual property rights policy is available at 
http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/document/Legal/ETSI_IPR-Policy.pdf. 
 
8For a discussion of recent legal disputes regarding hold-up within standard-setting, see e.g. Shapiro (2001), 
Farrell et al. (2007) and Geradin and Rato (2006). 
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IPR might expropriate substantial rents simply because standard adopters would incur high 
switching costs if licenses are not secured.  
The disclosure, licensing and negotiation rules of IP bylaws reflect this hold-up problem. 
SSOs oblige their members to disclose any known IPR which might be essential for 
standards. Furthermore, members are obliged to disclose their licensing intentions for 
essential IPR. Their ex ante commitment to reasonable and non-discriminatory licenses limits 
the hold-up power of essential IP owners and is prerequisite for the patent-protected 
technology to become standardized. Agreeing on RAND licensing terms does not oblige to 
specific licensing terms. It does, however, oblige to licensing negotiation that are conducted in 
good faith without deceiving SSO participants into ex-post hold-up. Royalty rates should be 
reasonable and non-discriminatory taken into account the technical alternatives and 
cumulative royalty rates for standards (Swanson and Baumol, 2005; Gilbert, 2009). 
Although IP bylaws impose obligations which are partially implicit, they do a fairly well job 
in preventing hold-up (Lemley, 2002; Geradin and Rato, 2006). Providers of essential 
technology commit themselves to negotiate RAND licensing terms in good faith after the 
standard has been defined (Merges, 1996). Hence, open standards can be regarded as 
certification that technology users will not be squeezed ex post (Farrell and Gallini, 1988; 
Fahri et al., 2005; Huang et al., 2013). 
2.2. The value of contributing IPR to open standards 
The voluntary contribution of IPR to open standards reveals that technology providers expect 
the lost benefits from exclusivity to be offset by the benefits from open standards. Licensing 
revenues from open standards are unlikely the primary motivation for IP contributions to open 
standards (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993). It does not seem accidental that open SSOs 
proliferate in those industries in which complex technologies offer a multitude of 
differentiated applications and in which demand for interoperability is high (Lemley, 2002; 
Simcoe, 2007). If interfaces are standardized, components from different suppliers and 
products from different market segments may be combined to form a larger technical system. 
The limited risk of open standards to be held up improves the attractiveness for producers to 
offer compatible products (Gawer and Henderson, 2007; Fahri et al. 2005; Huang et al., 
2013).  In turn, the available variety of complementary and compatible products improves the 
attractiveness of the standardization approach for customers (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). 
Expanding user bases stimulates the attractiveness of one standardization approach even 
further; for users and as well as for complementary product suppliers. A positive feedback is 
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generated which reinforces and installs the increasing market shares. Markets tend to tip to 
one dominant standard in such industries (Katz and Shapiro 1986, 1994; Shapiro and Varian, 
1999).  A large user base early on is, thus, crucial for standards to become entrenched by 
increasing returns to adoption. 
Network externalities provide powerful incentives for industry participants to coalesce around 
a single dominant standard (Schilling, 1998). Widespread adoption is more likely for open 
standardization approaches than for closed proprietary ones (Simcoe, 2007). Giving 
momentum to technology adoption and initiating a bandwagon of complementary product 
entry should be a major motivation for the contribution of IP to open standards. On the other 
hand, open and cooperative standards are subject to intensified competition which renders it 
harder for technology providers to capture value and sustain competitive advantages. This 
tension between cooperation and competition is inherent in standard setting processes. 
Although the consensus-driven approach to standardization emphasizes cooperation, 
participants compete fiercely to align standards with private benefits (Suarez, 2004). 
However, cooperation and open licensing is likely if the technology offers various 
applications to differentiated markets and if no single technology provider is able to block 
standardization due to a missing substitute technology (Barnett, 1990; Layne-Farrar et al., 
2010; Layne-Farrar and Lerner, 2011; Gambardella and Giarratana 2012).9 In summary, we 
expect that financial markets value IP sponsoring to open standards positively on average. IP 
contributions to open standard setting activities might be an indication for future profit of IP 
sponsors if open standards succeed to proliferate. 
Technology providers are usually not obliged by SSOs to indicate specific patent rights in 
their disclosure statement on essential IPR. General statements on the possession of essential 
IPR and the associated licensing intentions suffice to fulfill their obligations from IP bylaws. 
The reference to specific patents clarifies, however, technology ownership and elucidates the 
value of disclosed IP. It facilitates an assessment of the chance that the patent-protected 
technology will be standardized. 
Following the resource-based theory, Hsu and Ziedonis (2013) provide supporting evidence 
for patents to provide a dual advantage (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). They provide a 
quality signal for potential investors in addition to their role as legal safeguard for the 
                                                 
9Coordination is especially difficult if technology providers are heterogeneous (Simcoe, 2012). Temptations to 
split off from coordinated standards are high for specialized technology suppliers. As they lack revenues from 
downstream product markets, their participation has to be rewarded by licensing premiums (Schmalensee, 2009; 
Gilbert, 2009). In contrast, vertically-integrated incumbents adopt standards themselves in downstream markets. 
Licensing revenues play only a minor role for them. Coordination among vertically-integrated firms should be 
easier as profits are made largely downstream. 
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commercial use of standardized technology (O'Mahony, 2003). The quality of IP contributions 
and the likelihood that the sponsored technology will actually become part of a standard are 
difficult to judge for financial markets. Investors and other market participants typically face 
an informational disadvantage as compared to firm insiders (Hall and Lerner, 2010). IP 
disclosures which refer explicitly to the associated patent rights might signal financial markets 
the quality of contributions. These contributions might provide additional value as quality 
signal that improves the terms of trade in financial markets for the contributing firm (Stuart et 
al., 1999). Hence, disclosure of relevant IP ownership, which explicates associated patent 
rights, should achieve higher valuations from financial markets than generally held IP 
statements.  
We summarize the preceding discussion regarding the benefits from contributing IPR to open 
ICT standards and regarding the different statements of standard-relevant IP ownership in 
subsequent hypotheses: 
 
H1a: Disclosure of standard-relevant IP ownership is positively valued by financial markets 
 
H1b: Disclosure of standard-relevant IP ownership is more valuable if the associated patent 
rights are revealed. 
 
During phases of turbulent technology evolution, the quality of technologies is particularly 
difficult to judge for financial markets (Stuart et al., 1999). SSO adjudicate the process of 
technology evolution by providing technology sponsors a forum for coordination (Rosenkopf 
and Tushman, 1998). Consortia and alliances are formed among technology providers in order 
to promote their technical approaches for standardization (Leiponen, 2008). In these situations 
of uncertainty, the endorsement by standard developing technical experts signals financial 
markets the quality of contributions to standardization (Corbett et al., 2005; Simcoe and 
Waguespack, 2011). The strategic and economic importance of IP contributions to open 
standards is illustrated by increasing citation rates of disclosed patents (Rysman and Simcoe, 
2008). It is also reflected by the distributional conflicts and the associated slowdown in open 
standard setting processes (Simcoe, 2012). Hence, the open, consensus- and merit-based 
development of standards certifies the quality of standardized technology contributions 
(Lerner and Tirole, 2006). 
Participation in SSOs permits furthermore to establish and cultivate relationships with peers 
in the technology domain. The endorsement of high status technical experts and the 
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participation in alliances with established technology providers increases the visibility and 
reputation of contributing firms (Lerner and Tirole, 2002). The selection of technologies 
based on technical merit provides opportunities for exchange, feedback and learning (King et 
al., 2005). SSO participation facilitates monitoring and staying abreast of technological 
evolution (Waguespack and Fleming, 2009). 
Hence, firms with low R&D intensities, which lack a large technology portfolio that allows 
them to make favorable deals in bargaining negotiations, should benefit from SSO 
participation additionally due to accessing important external knowledge (Acemoglu et al., 
2010; Bessen, 2012). The endorsement of technology contributions by technical experts 
should be particular important for those firms for which R&D activities indicate limited 
technological quality. IP disclosures to SSOs should, thus, be particularly valuable for firms 
with low R&D intensities. This is summarized in the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Disclosure of standard-relevant IP ownership is more valuable for firms with low R&D 
intensity. 
 
3. Estimation Approach 
Publicly traded companies can be regarded as bundles of tangible and intangible assets whose 
value is determined by financial markets. As market prices for intangible assets are usually 
not observable, hedonic pricing models are used to assess the contributions of various assets 
to firm value (Griliches, 1981). The market valuation of companies is a forward looking 
measure for financial market’s expectations on the returns from investments in different 
assets. If financial markets work efficiently, it can be assumed that financial markets value 
various assets simultaneously according to their discounted value of expected cash flows. A 
number of recent empirical studies use the market value approach to assess the contributions 
of tangible and intangible assets to firm value (Hall et al., 2005; Czarnitzki et al., 2011). We 
follow Griliches (1981) by assuming a linear market value function that is additively 
separable in assets. According to (1), 
 
( ) ( ),
or   log log log log 1
t
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it jt t it t
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V A K q A K
KV q A
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σγ
σ σ γ
= +
 
= + + + 
 
 (1) 
the value Vit of company i in year t is given by the sum of physical assets Ait and knowledge 
assets Kit. The parameter γit represents the marginal value contribution of an one-unit increase 
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in the ratio of knowledge capital to physical assets. The current valuation coefficient qjt 
captures factors that affect firm value multiplicatively, like time- and industry-specific effects. 
σt indicates the returns to scale of factor inputs. Following the empirical literature (Hall, 2000; 
Czarnitzki et al., 2011), we assume constant returns to scale, i.e. σt=1.10 Equation (1) can then 
be rewritten as 
 log log log log 1it itit jt
it it
V KQ q
A A
γ = = + + 
 
 (2) 
The left hand side of the equation (2) is the log of Tobin’s Q, defined as the ratio of market 
value to replacement cost of physical assets. γ represents the shadow value of investors for the 
ratio of knowledge capital to physical assets. We use different variables to measure firm’s 
knowledge assets K. First, we use the stock of firm’s R&D expenses (Hall, 1993). As R&D 
expenses measure the input into highly uncertain activities, we use additionally the stock of 
patent applications as a measure for successfully finished R&D activities (e.g. Blundell et al., 
1999). Since previous literature has shown that the distribution of patent value is highly 
skewed (Pakes, 1986; Schankerman and Pakes, 1986; Harhoff et al., 1999; Deng, 2007; 
Gambardella et al., 2008), we further add patent citations as a patent quality indicator to the 
specification (Hall et al., 2005). Forward patent citations have been shown to correlate 
positively with patents’ social as well as with its private value (Trajtenberg, 1990; Harhoff et 
al., 1999; Hall et al., 2005). They further reflect the economic and technological importance 
of patents as perceived by inventors and knowledgeable peers in the technology domain 
(Albert et al., 1991; Jaffe et al., 2000). 
Besides these well-established measures for firm’s knowledge stocks, we further include the 
stock of firm i’s disclosures of standard-relevant IP ownership. Members are required to 
disclose known patent rights which might be relevant for discussed standards. 
 1 2 3 4
&log log log 1
&
it it it it
it it
it it it it
R D PAT CIT DisclosureQ q
A R D PAT PAT
γ γ γ γ = + + + + + 
 
 (3) 
Proxies for firm’s knowledge stock enter the estimation equation in a cascading specification.  
Each variable is normalized by the preceding one. Disclosureit enters othogonalized by firm’s 
patent stock. The coefficients in this cascading specification have to be interpreted as a 
premium or a discount on the former variable. Regarding our variable of main interest, the 
stock of disclosures, the estimated coefficient γ4 is expected to be positive, showing a 
valuation premium beyond firm’s patent stock and conditional on the valuation premium of 
                                                 
10We find a significant coefficient of approximately one for regressions of logAit on logVit in the cross-section. 
The assumption of constant returns to scale seems therefore reasonable. 
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patent citations. According to hypothesis 1b, revealing associated patent rights in disclosures 
of standard-relevant IP ownership might signal financial markets the quality of technological 
contributions. We will investigate this hypothesis by separating the disclosure stocks between 
those indicating associate patent rights and the remaining general ones. These distinct stocks 
will enter equation (3) separately. 
4. Data 
4.1. Sample 
Our sample consists of yearly firm-level information on 609 publicly traded companies during 
1976 and 2005. These companies are traded on US capital markets and consist in large parts 
of large incumbent firms. They are active in industries in which at least one company 
disclosed standard-relevant IP to the considered SSOs. These are mechanical and electrical 
engineering, electronics, instruments, transport equipment, communications as well as holding 
companies in respective industries. Data on market value, tangible assets and R&D 
expenditures of the companies have been retrieved from the Compustat database. This results 
in an unbalanced panel of 7,095 observations. Information on US patent applications has been 
retrieved from the NBER patent and citations dataset (Hall et al., 2001). The match to 
Compustat firms is provided by Bessen (2009). 
Information on technology disclosures to eight SSOs has been gathered. These organizations 
are the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the Alliance for Telecommunications 
Industry Solutions (ATIS), the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the Telecommunications 
Industry Association (TIA). All these organizations have installed a formalized IP policy, 
require disclosure of essential IP and allow royalties to be charged for essential IP in 
exceptional cases. Although these non-profit organizations differ in degree of openness and 
have various definitions of consensus, heterogeneity among them can be characterized as 
“accidental” (Lemley, 2002). In the 1990s and 2000s, their activities have been dominated by 
the digital transition of telecommunication networks and the convergence between 
information and telecommunication technologies.11 
                                                 
11Appendix 1 provides an overview of major standards developed by these eight organizations. 
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SSOs require their members to disclose eventually standard-relevant IPR. This information is 
published on SSO websites. Disclosures of relevant IP at ANSI, ATIS, IEEE, ITU and TIA 
have been retrieved from Rysman’s and Simcoe’s dataset (2008).12 IP disclosures at ETSI, 
ISO and IETF have been retrieved from their websites. Disclosures at ESTI refer 
predominately to digital telecommunications (GSM, UMTS). Unfortunately, information on 
the standard for which disclosed IP might be essential is only available for ETSI and ISO. 
Disclosures at TIA should refer predominately to the competing CDMA approach. Sample 
firms’ disclosures to ATIS occur from the midst of the 1990s until the beginning of the 2000s. 
They should refer to US standardization efforts for 3G. ISO standards refer overwhelmingly 
to different MPEG generations. IEEE standards refer presumably in its majority to WiFi 
technology. In view of ANSI’s interface function to international standard bodies, disclosures 
to ANSI should reflect telecom standards as well as standards for information technologies. 
ITU standards may, in parts, refer to the discussed US and European telecommunication 
standards. However, they reflect surely technology contributions to standards in other world 
regions, too. 
 
Figure 1 Evolution of sample disclosures 
 
 
We have found 1446 disclosures events for sample firms. Table 1 shows that most of them 
refer to disclosures of IP ownership which are relevant for ETSI standards. Some disclosure 
statements indicate that the IP owner does not agree on licensing at reasonable and non-
                                                 
12Available at http://www.ssopatents.org. 
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discriminatory terms. This is the case for eleven disclosures by our sample firm. These 
observations are not included in disclosure stocks since these technologies are essentially 
precluded from incorporation in open and consensus-based standards. The remaining events 
disclose reasonable and non-discriminatory licensing intentions if the associated IP is 
essential to standards. RAND licensing terms may entail royalties or not. Figure 1 depicts the 
evolution of these disclosure events. Increasing disclosure numbers reflect the general trend of 
surging disclosure rates (Simcoe, 2007). Peaking disclosure activities in 1995 reflect intense 
standardization activities with respect to US CDMA technology. High rates in 1993 and 
escalating disclosures at the beginning of the 2000s reflect standardization of the second and 
third generation of digital telecommunication at ETSI. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Disclosures of standard-relevant IP ownership differ in scope. Some disclosures declare 
broadly that the disclosing firm might possess relevant IP without specifying single patent 
rights. Other disclosures reveal specific patent rights which might be standard-relevant. In 
order to take into account their varying scope, IP disclosures have been weighted according to 
the number of disclosed patent rights. Roughly half of the disclosure events in our sample 
reveal specific patent rights. Disclosure events indicating specific patents occur 
overwhelmingly at ETSI. General disclosures are relatively seldom at ETSI. Generally-held 
IP disclosures are more frequent than patent-indicating disclosures at the remaining SSOs. 
 
4.2. Variables 
Our empirical analysis is based on equation (3)(3). The dependent variable Tobin’s Q is 
defined as the ratio of firm’s market value to the replacement (book) value of its physical 
assets. Market value is the sum of market capitalization (share price times the number of 
outstanding shares at the end of a year), preferred stock, minority interests, and total debt 
minus cash. Book value is the sum of net property, plant and equipment, current assets, long 
term receivables, investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and other investments. All 
explanatory variables of equation (3) are based on stock variables. Except for tangible assets 
for which financial stock information is available, we follow Griliches and Mairesse (1981) 
by calculating the stocks for the remaining explanatory variables as perpetual inventory. 
We use the following formula for the R&D stock of firm i in year t 
14 
 ( ) 1&  1 &  &it it itR D stock R D stock R Dδ −= − +  (4)  
in which the annual R&D expenditures enter GDP-deflated and a constant depreciation rate 
(δ) of 15 percent is assumed. 
Patent, citation and IP disclosure stocks are constructed accordingly. IP disclosure stocks are 
further distinguished between disclosures of standard-relevant IP ownership, which refer 
explicitly to associated patent rights, and generally-held disclosures which do not indicate the 
associated patent rights. The stock of citations which disclosed patents receive prior to their 
first disclosure has been calculated in order to proxy for the importance of contributed 
technology. 
A specialty arises for the calculation of R&D stocks since companies may have conducted 
R&D before entering our sample. Hence, we calculate a starting equilibrium R&D stock as 
0
0
&&  ii
R DR D stock
gδ= + . 
This starting value assumes that R&D expenditures prior to the sample have been growing at 
a constant rate g. Following Hall and Oriani (2006) and Hall et al. (2006) an annual growth 
rate of 8 percent has been assumed. 
4.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample and firms that contribute IP to SSOs. 
The descriptive statistics illustrates that our sample includes overwhelmingly medium-sized 
and large companies. All firms in our sample have positive R&D and patent stocks. Average 
Tobin’s Q is well above one. Market valuation of sample firms is larger on average than the 
replacement value of tangible assets. R&D activities, patent portfolio size, citations as well as 
standard-setting activities are highly skewed in absolute and relative terms. Only five percent 
of observations have disclosed relevant IP to SSOs. The second half of Table 2 provides 
descriptive statistics for these 334 observations. The distribution of industry sectors appears 
similar between the total sample and standard setting firms. Technology providers to SSOs are 
mostly large and very large companies. On average, they have larger stocks of tangibles 
assets, more R&D activities and larger patent portfolios than the control group. The median 
value for Tobin’s Q is slightly higher than for the average control firm. Disclosure stocks 
reach their maximum at 148 disclosures of RAND licensing intentions. RAND licenses may 
involve royalties or may be royalty-free. Eight observations have been excluded that show 
more than ten disclosures per patent.  
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Companies which contribute IP to SSOs receive similar citations per patent than the control 
group. Prior literatures has shown that IP contributions for standardization are among the 
more valuable technologies (Rysman and Simcoe, 2008). This is reflected in the number of 
received citations prior to their first disclosure to any SSO. Firms receive, on average, 12 
citations per patent in their portfolio. In contrast, they receive, on average, 19 citations per IP 
disclosure. 
 
5. Market Value Estimations 
Table 3 reports the coefficients from nonlinear least squares estimations for equation (3). The 
first panel in Table 3 (model (1)-(4)) presents estimations including firm’s total disclosure 
stock. The second panel (model (5)-(8)) distinguishes between disclosures of IP ownership 
which refer explicitly to associated patents or not. The first model in each panel (model (1) 
and model (5)) shows cross-sectional results. The second model in both panels (model (2) and 
model (6)) controls for unobserved firm-specific effects. We follow Blundell et al. (1995) and 
Aghion et al. (2005) in using pre-sample information as control for unobserved firm-specific 
effects. Average Tobin’s Q in the pre-sample period is included as additional regressor in 
model (2) and (6).  
The third model in both panels (model (3) and model (7)) controls for pre-disclosure citations. 
The stock of received citations until the first disclosure of the patent as standard-relevant shall 
control for the selection of more important IP to be disclosed as standard-relevant (Rysman 
and Simcoe, 2008). In order to avoid double-counting, citation stocks are corrected by pre-
disclosure citations. The last models in each panel (model (4) and model (8)) show the results 
for a specification that incudes pre-disclosure citations and pre-sample means. All 
specifications include year and industry dummies. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Table 3 shows that our results are robust with regards to the different specifications. The 
proxies for firm’s knowledge stock – R&D, patent and citation stocks – are positively and 
significantly correlated with Tobin’s Q (Hall et al., 2005; 2006). As regards to the variable of 
main interest, disclosure of standard-relevant IP ownership, model (1) in Table 3 shows a 
positive sign for overall IP disclosures which is statistically significant at the 5% level. This 
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effect vanishes if the pre-sample mean of Tobin’s Q or the normalized pre-disclosure citation 
stock is added (models (2)-(4)). This finding does not support hypothesis 1a. 
Models (5)-(8) present estimation results if disclosure of standard-relevant IP ownership is 
separated in disclosures indicating specific patent rights and generally-held disclosures. The 
positive coefficient for generally-held IP disclosures is weakly significant only if firm-specific 
effects or the importance of disclosed patents is not controlled. This does not indicate that 
financial markets value disclosures of standard-relevant IP ownership without revealing the 
associated patent rights. The coefficients for IP disclosures, which specify associated patents, 
are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in all models (5)-(8). The disclosure of 
standard-relevant patents is still positively correlated with firm valuation if firm-specific 
effects or the importance of disclosed patents are controlled. The benefits from contributing 
IPR to open ICT standards appear to outweigh the costs of lost exclusivity. Hypothesis 1b, 
hence, receives support. 
In order to get an indication of the economic magnitude of the estimated effects, Table 4 
reports semi-elasticities of Tobin’s Q with regard to its explanatory variables. The semi-
elasticities are calculated using the median values of explanatory variables.13 Estimated semi-
elasticities for IP disclosures indicate that an increase from 0 to 1 of the disclosure-patent ratio 
would increase the log of Tobin’s Q by a range of 7.4 to 8.9 points. The standard deviation of 
the disclosure-patent ratio (=0.23%) provides a more realistic order of magnitude. A one 
standard deviation change yields a change in market value between 1.7 and 2.1 percent. 
Hence, the benefits from contributing IPR to open ICT standards appear to outweigh the cost 
of lost exclusivity. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Table 5 and Table 6 re-estimate models (1)-(8) for split samples of lowly or highly R&D-
intensive firms. Median R&D intensity of industry sectors is chosen to divide the sample into 
firms of low and high R&D intensity. Overall disclosures of relevant IP ownership do not 
show significant effects for firms with low R&D intensity (columns (1)-(4) of Table 5). For 
firms with high R&D intensity, the coefficient of overall IP disclosures is positive and 
                                                 
13In comparison to Hall et al.s’ (2005) results for the market value of R&D and patenting, we find lower values 
of R&D semi-elasticities and larger values of patent semi-elasticities. In contrast to Hall’s sample, which refers 
to manufacturing sectors from 1979 to 1988, our sample focuses on machinery and electronics-related sectors 
from 1986-2002. Hall (1993) reports that in those particular industries, the value of R&D declined in the 1980s. 
As knowledge assets have been found to be of lower values in computing and electrical sectors (Czarnitzki et al. 
2006), it seems not unreasonable that the value of R&D assets has further declined in our sample period. 
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significant only if firm-specific effects or the importance of disclosed patents are not 
controlled. 
 
Table 5 and Table 6 about here 
 
Estimated coefficients for IP disclosures, which refer explicitly to patents, are positive and 
significant for firms of high and low R&D intensity (models (5)-(8) of Table 5 and Table 6). 
Table 4 reports the respective semi-elasticities for split samples. For R&D intensive firms, 
estimated semi-elasticities indicate that a change of one standard deviation in the IP 
disclosure-patent stock ratio yields 2.0% to 4.3% higher market values. For firms of low R&D 
intensity, the corresponding change in market value ranges from 2.6% and 3.3%.  
The marginal disclosure effect for firms with low R&D intensity is significantly higher than 
the marginal disclosure effect for R&D-intensive firms only in model (5) which does not 
control for pre-disclosure citations or firm-specific effects. Tests for R&D intensive firms to 
have higher semi-elasticity values cannot be rejected for models (6)-(8). The higher valuation 
of patent disclosures for firms with low R&D intensities in model (5) appears to reflect the 
importance of their specified IPR contribution to open standards. This suggests that firms with 
low R&D intensity contribute important IPR to standardization. However, it does not support 
hypothesis 2 for higher marginal disclosure effects on the valuation of firms with low R&D 
intensity. The results do not suggest a valuation premium due to accessing technological 
knowledge in open standard setting processes. 
Disclosure of standard-relevant IP ownership without revealing associated patent rights shows 
a significant positive sign for firms with high R&D intensity, if firm-specific effects or the 
importance of disclosed patents are not controlled (model (5) of Table 6). Generally-held IP 
disclosures are not significantly correlated with the valuation of R&D-intensive firms if pre-
disclosure citations or firm-specific effects are controlled. Disclosure of IP ownership without 
revealing associated patent rights is negatively correlated with the valuation of lowly R&D-
intensive firms. This holds irrespective of firm-specific effects or pre-disclosure citations 
(models (5)-(8) of Table 7). This suggests that disclosure of standard-relevant IP ownership 
without revealing associated patent rights signals financial markets a low quality of the 
contribution to standardization. Patents appear to signal financial markets the technological 
quality of contributions from firms with low R&D intensity. 
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6. Conclusion 
Open standards, set by organizations in which technology providers cooperate voluntarily, 
have gained significant importance in the last decades. These organizations have considerable 
impact on market and technology evolution and supplanted formal public SSOs in many cases 
(Funk and Methe, 2001; Cargill, 2002). Recent economic studies on cooperative standard 
setting emphasize coordination problems (e.g. Schmalensee, 2009; Layne-Farrar et al., 2010). 
Large-scale empirical evidence on the returns of sponsoring IPR to open standards is missing 
so far. When firms disclose IPR to SSOs, they face the risk of revealing technical knowledge 
during the standard development process without knowing whether the respective technology 
will become part of a standard or not. Even in case the technology becomes part of the 
standard, it cannot be taken for granted that open standards will proliferate or the benefits 
thereof outweigh the costs, e.g. in terms of giving up exclusivity for universal RAND 
licensing conditions. 
We employ a market value approach in order to investigate the valuation of disclosing 
standard-relevant IP ownership. The sample consists of large established companies which 
have been publicly-traded in the US during 1986 to 2005. Information on firm’s IP 
contributions to eight major SSOs has been retrieved. These contributions reveal that the IP 
owner is prepared to grant reasonable and non-discriminatory licenses for essential IPR. 
The results show that IP contributions to open standards are positively correlated with 
company valuation if they refer explicitly to associated patents. We do not find that the 
positive value correlation of patent disclosures vanishes if firm-specific effects or the 
selection of more important patents is controlled. The benefits from contributing IPR to open 
ICT standards appear to outweigh the loss from waiving exclusivity. 
SSOs adjudicate the process of technology evolution (Rosenbloom and Tushman, 1998). They 
are important venues for learning, producing, exchanging and promoting technical knowledge 
(Waguespack and Flemming, 2009). Standardization codifies frontier technical knowledge 
and support the diffusion and adoption of new technologies (Bessen, 2012; Acemoglu et al., 
2010). Hence, firms with comparably low R&D intensities might be expected to benefit 
additionally from access to frontier technical knowledge. Endorsement from technical experts 
might signal financial markets the quality of their contributions (Corbett et al., 2005; King et 
al., 2005). 
IP disclosures of firms with low R&D intensity appear to be more valued by financial 
markets. However, this effect vanishes if the pre-disclosure importance of disclosed patents is 
controlled for. This suggests that firms with low R&D intensities may contribute important 
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IPR to standardization. However, we do not find evidence for higher marginal disclosure 
effects on the valuation of firms with low R&D intensity. This does not suggest that their 
access to frontier technological knowledge is valued additionally.  
Disclosure of standard-relevant IP ownership without revealing associated patent rights is 
negatively correlated with the valuation of lowly R&D-intensive firms. Generally-held IP 
disclosures are not significantly correlated with the valuation of R&D-intensive firms. This 
suggests that patents signal financial markets the quality of IPR contributions from firms with 
low R&D intensity. Further research should study the motives to disclose IPR ownership 
without referring to associated IP. Information on participation in standard-setting meetings 
and further information on the scope of IPR or standards might provide further insights on 
knowledge sourcing and IP strategies.  
This study provides evidence for positive valuation effects of IPR contributions to open 
standards. The benefits from contributing IPR to open standards appear to outweigh the loss 
of exclusivity. The provided evidence refers to large established companies which participate 
in open SSOs; and particularly in standard-setting at the ETSI. It has to be kept in mind that 
incentives to participate to open standards might be different for specialized technology 
suppliers. 
The importance of strong exclusive rights is frequently emphasized for gaining competitive 
advantage from new technology. This study suggests a more nuanced view that management 
should carefully evaluate whether to follow temptations to insist on exclusivity if the 
competitive environment is characterized by strong network effects. To the extent that the 
correlation of market value and disclosure of IP ownership represents a causal effect, our 
results show that the benefits from technology contributions to open standards may outweigh 
associated costs, e. g. due to lost exclusivity. Identification of causal effects requires 
estimation of the counterfactual situation. We have focused on a comparison between 
disclosing and non-disclosing firms for lack of an experimental setting. Therefore, it cannot 
be ruled out entirely that the correlation of market value and IP disclosure results from 
unobserved heterogeneities although we do not find evidence for it.  
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Appendix A   Sample SSOs 
Multiple and partially incompatible standards have been in operation in Western Europe 
during the era of analog telecommunication. In order to promote an integrated market, the 
European Commission mandated a single harmonized standard for digital telecommunication. 
Simultaneously, telecommunications operations have been deregulated (Besen, 1990). 
Standard development has been delegated to ETSI. The worldwide success of European 
standards for digital telecommunication is attributed to the early coordination efforts and the 
large market size for harmonized standards (Funk and Methe, 2001; Gandal et al., 2003). 
Major ETSI standards are GSM, UMTS and LTE. GSM is ETSI’s successful 2G standard. 
UMTS is its next generation successor. When success of ETSI’s UMTS approach for 3G 
standards became conceivable, standardization of mobile telecommunications have been 
transferred to the international 3GPP consortium. 3GPP is an international collaboration with 
ATIS and SSOs from Japan and Korea. At the end of our sample period, first standardization 
efforts began for LTE as the 4G telecommunication standard. 
In contrast to the European approach, US regulators have chosen not to mandate unified 
telecommunication standards. Committee T1 is responsible for network reliability and 
interoperability of all equipment accessing the US telecommunications network (de Lacey et 
al., 2006). They collaborate with the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions 
(ATIS) in order to fulfill this task. Fundamental differences between competing technical 
approaches have made it difficult to reach consensus. Furthermore, the fiercest competitor of 
European GSM standards, Qualcomm and its CDMA technology, has chosen a very closed 
and misleading licensing approach. Qualcomm’s CDMA approach has been promoted by TIA 
(Rosenkopf et al., 2001). ETSI and TIA can, therefore, be considered as competing 
organizations in the standardization of digital services. When US firms started coordinative 
efforts to accelerate decision making processes at ATIS, ETSI’s GSM standards have already 
been introduced to the marketplace (Steinbock, 2003). 
In comparison to other considered SSOs, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) follows 
particularly open standardization processes. IETF develops standards for protocols and 
procedures that are used in or by the Internet, as for instance the TCP/IP which routes data 
between computers (Simcoe, 2012). Along with rapid growth and commercialization of the 
Internet during the 1990s, IETF transformed from an open network of computer scientists to 
the primary forum for Internet standardization. Inherited conventions of openness among 
software developers have been retained. Participation to standard setting processes is not 
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restricted. Any individual may join and monitor this process by subscribing to an email list. 
Standard setting processes at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) can 
also be considered as particularly open. IEEE is primarily a professional engineering 
association. Its standard-setting subdivision is open to corporations as well as to individual 
members. IEEE’s major contributions to the ICT domain are the standards for wireless local 
area networks (WiFi).14 
Telecommunication standards are predominately developed by corporate representatives sent 
to SSOs. In order to mitigate antitrust concerns, an US forum of technical coordination may 
apply for certification by ANSI. ANSI is the US umbrella standard-setting organization that 
certifies voluntary standardization organizations as being fair, open and consensus-based. 
ATIS and TIA are, for instance, accredited by ANSI. ANSI is an interface for US 
standardization efforts to the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). ANSI 
promotes internationally the standards developed by certified SSOs. 
ISO is the international umbrella organization of national standard setting organizations. It 
develops compatibility standards in cooperation with the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) in the Joint Technical Committee (JTC). ISO has prohibited traditionally 
intellectual property ownership on standards (Lemley and McGowan, 1998). This has 
changed recently in recognition that proprietary products may become de facto standards. The 
danger to lose touch with current technological developments is particularly acute in markets 
that are characterized by strong network effects. In order to keep ISO standardization 
processes current with ICT markets, ISO standards may, in the meanwhile, rely on intellectual 
property if technical reasons justify such a step and worldwide RAND licenses will be 
granted.15 Disclosures of relevant IP at ISO refer in large parts to standards developed by the 
Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG). This working group developed several standard 
generations for audio and video compression and transmission. The MPEG LA patent pool 
emerged as a result of this standardization process (Merges, 2001). 
ITU-T is another international standard setting body. It is an U.N. organization in which 
delegates from member nations participate. The historic preeminence of ITU in setting 
international telecommunications standards has been increasingly threatened by the 
emergence of regional SSOs (Besen and Farrell, 1991). In response to this development, 
                                                 
14For a discussion of WiFi standards and their development, we refer to de Lacey et al. (2006). 
 
15See ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, "Rules for the structure and drafting of International Standards", available at: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/standards_development/processes_and_procedures/iso_iec_directives_and_iso_suppleme
nt.htm 
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commercial enterprises have greater opportunities to submit technical proposal now. Voting 
rights are, however, still reserved to national government representatives. 
 
Appendix B  Standard Development Procedures 
The development process of technical specifications for standardization is in large parts 
similar across different consensus-based organizations (Lehr, 1995; Layne-Farrar, 2011). 
Figure 2 sketches this process. If a compatibility problem is identified or emerges from new 
technical opportunities, members may submit a work item proposal to the SSO boards. If the 
proposal is approved because it is considered as technically feasible and desirable, the task of 
developing a technical specification is assigned to an appropriate working group. Working 
groups consist of technical experts delegated from governments, academia, customers and 
companies. The Moving Pictures Expert Groups is an example for such a working group 
formed by ISO (International Organization for Standards).16  When internal disagreements 
regarding the merits of different versions are reconciled, the boards have to approve the 
chosen technical approach. Subsequently, a draft specification is published and interested 
parties are invited to comment on it. 
 
Figure 2 The process of developing standards 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own illustration; based on Leiponen (2007), Simcoe (2012) and Layne-Farrar (2008) 
 
During the process of commenting on draft specifications, SSO participants are obliged to 
reveal essential proprietary technology of which they are aware. Clarification whether 
technical specifications read on exclusive patent rights is essential to standardization. Bylaws 
of SSOs explicitly or implicitly oblige their members to disclose relevant patents and 
associated licensing intentions (Lemley, 2002). Members’ acceptance of these bylaws allows 
SSOs to act as forum of non-discriminatory coordination. The obligation to disclose IP and its 
licensing intentions permits standard setting bodies to adjust draft specifications according to 
                                                 
16http://mpeg.chiariglione.org/ 
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the availability of exclusion rights. Participants shall reveal IP if it may be essential to the 
adoption of standards. They are, however, not obliged to search their portfolios for eventually 
infringing patents. General statements that they might possess relevant IP suffice to comply 
with the disclosure requirement. 
Before a draft can be approved, comments have to be responded and reconciled with the draft. 
This may result in new draft versions. After formal change requests have been responded and 
consensus is reached, a first standard version can be released. A general technical approach is 
agreed upon in this early stage of the standardization process. Strategic maneuvering is often 
intense here as path and direction of further technology evolution is largely predetermined by 
the chosen technical approach in the first standard version (Suarez, 2004; Layne-Farrar, 
2011). Coalitions are restructured to align positions and gain supporters for technical 
approaches. When the general technological path is agreed upon, working groups define 
specifications for components of the chosen technical systems. The process of consensus-
finding, board approval and change control start anew for these technical designs. Strategic 
maneuvering should be less intense in these later stages. Coalitions which gained majority for 
a general technical paradigm are stable during these phases of incremental change (Rosenkopf 
and Tushman, 2002). Updated standard versions refine or amend technical specifications. 
User knowledge is incorporated into standardization. Market competition selects among 
various technical approaches proposed by different (supra-) national SSOs.  
International standard setting starts in the shadow of this competition. International standard 
bodies often do not propose single standards to solve a compatibility problem. They usually 
certify important standards in different world regions. When efficiency and effectiveness 
improvements of a technical approach to standardization have reached the limits of feasibility, 
new standard generations begin to loom and the process of strategizing begins anew, although 
already installed bases may put incumbents at advantage. 
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Appendix B Tables 
 
Table 1 Disclosure of standard-relevant IP ownership 
 
 
  
SSO
ANSI 15 53
ATIS 0 11
ETSI 599 196
IEEE 45 0
IETF 30 49
ISO 27 125
ITU 19 103
TIA 6 156
741 693
Identified IP disclosed General Disclosures
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
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Table 3 Valuation for disclosure of standard-relevant IP ownership 
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